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H.Bharani , Karpaga Vinayaga College of Engineering & technlogy; M.Kanchana, Karpaga Vinayaga College of Engineering & technlogy; S.B.Dhivya, Karpaga Vinayaga College of Engineering & technlogy


Cooperation, Incentives, Ad Hoc Network


In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), tasks are conducted based on the cooperation of nodes in the networks. However, since the nodes are usually constrained by limited computation resources, selfish nodes may refuse to be cooperative. Reputation systems and price-based systems are two main solutions to the node non co-operation problem. A reputation system evaluates node behaviours by reputation values and uses a reputation threshold to distinguish trustworthy nodes and untrustworthy nodes. A price-based system uses virtual cash to control the transactions of a packet forwarding service. Although these two kinds of systems have been widely used, very little research has been devoted to investigating the effectiveness of the node cooperation incentives provided by the systems. In this project, we use game theory to analyze the cooperation incentives provided by these two systems and by a system with no cooperation incentive strategy. We find that the strategies of using a threshold to determine the trustworthiness of a node in the reputation system and of rewarding cooperative nodes in the price-based system may be manipulated by clever or wealthy but selfish nodes. We further enhance the system by addressing the security issues of cooperative nodes. This provides security by encrypting the packet in sender and then it forwards to the intermediate node. And the packets are decrypted by the receiver node. Obviously the packets are not lost during data transmission

Other Details

Paper ID: IJSRDV2I3048
Published in: Volume : 2, Issue : 3
Publication Date: 01/06/2014
Page(s): 157-161

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