Overcoming the Inside Attacks in VANET

Vehicular networks are becoming wide technology in traffic system. The entities that are part of a vehicular communication system can be private or public vehicles, road-side infrastructure, and authorities, with the latter considered primarily as network entities. The vision for vehicular ad hoc networks includes the frequent exchange of data by vehicles to facilitate route planning, road safety and e-commerce applications. Poorly designed VANETs that permit serious attacks on the network can jeopardize the goal of increased driving safety. In a VANET, for simpler attacks than data modification exist, such as for example transmitting fraudulent data about road congestion or vehicle position, and such attacks can be quite damaging. Hence, security in a VANET relies upon the potentially more challenging problem of handling intruders. Currently we promote a data centric approach for handling intruder exemption. Among these, we identify redundancy as a promising approach particularly for evaluating the scenario of multihop protocols. Representing a message transfer of a multihop protocol as a directed graph, we derive metrics to assess communication redundancy. As a future work of our project we propose to integrate the VANET with the inexpensive wireless sensor network (WSN). That is sensor nodes are deployed along the roadside to sense road conditions and to buffer and deliver information about dangerous conditions to vehicles regardless of the density or connectivity of the VANET. We design a four-way handshake that allows the roadside mote and the information gathering car mote to mutually authenticate themselves, thereby preventing misbehaviour intrusion.